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ADAM H. KOBLENZ, ESQ.* 
The Whole Nine Yards: Should Student-Athletes 
Score an Education and Compensation? 
This Article analyzes whether student-athletes are adequately compensated for their 
contributions. It also explores whether colleges and universities have any fiduciary 
duty to ensure a certain modicum of academic success and career development. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) Division I athletics have been 
an integral part of American culture for decades.1 With the advent of multimedia 
technologies, collegiate sports now reach a national audience, thus increasing the 
accessibility for fans to follow their favorite teams.2 Due to the widespread 
commercialization of large collegiate sporting events such as the Final Four and the 
College Football Playoff, collegiate sports have become a major revenue generating 
business, both at the university and corporate level.3 Millions of dollars in revenue 
are generated “through ticket sales, endorsement deals, broadcasting deals and jersey 
sales.”4 Everyone involved, from corporate sponsors to university administrators to 
 
© 2017 Adam H. Koblenz 
      *    Attorney-At-Law; B.A., Brandeis University, 2003; J.D., The George Washington University Law 
School, 2006. Mr. Koblenz would like to thank his wife, Bess, and his two daughters, Charlotte and Skylar, for 
their love and support. 
 1.  See Thomas Rosandich, Collegiate Sports Programs: A Comparative Analysis, 122 EDUC. 471, 472–75 
(2002); Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 2011, https://www. 
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017). 
 2.  See, e.g., NCAA March Madness Live VR App to Offer Enhanced Virtual Reality Experience for 2017 
NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Championship, NCAA (Mar. 21, 2017, 1:28 PM), http://www. 
ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/article/2017-03-20/ncaar-march-madnessr-livetm-vr-app-offer-enhanced-
virtual. 
 3.  See Michael S. McLeran, Comment, Playing for Peanuts: Determining Fair Compensation for NCAA 
Student-Athletes, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 255, 260–61 (2017); Johnathan Berr, March Madness: Follow the 
Money, CBS NEWS (Mar. 20, 2015, 5:45 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/march-madness-follow-the-
money/; Playoffs are a Revenue Bonanza for College Football, NBC NEWS (Jan. 1 2015, 2:42 PM ET), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/playoffs-are-revenue-bonanza-college-football-n277641. 
 4.  See generally Krikor Meshefejian, Pay to Play: Should College Athletes be Paid?, Opposing 
Viewpoints in Context (2008), http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/ovic/ViewpointsDetailsPage/DocumentToolsPortlet 
Window?displayGroupName=Viewpoints&jsid=eefbd8901aad2960f1f563899801e024&action=2&catId=&doc
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coaches alike, receives a portion of the “financial pie.”5 The party responsible for 
these economic rewards, the student-athlete, is arguably left out of this equation.6 
Therefore, it is imperative to explore certain conflicts that arise when college athletes 
are exploited for their on-field talent, as the academic component suffers at the 
student-athlete’s expense.7 
The critical issues that will be addressed in this Article are: (1) whether student-
athletes should be compensated for their player likeness, on-field performance, right 
to publicity and income generated from apparel sales, television, mobile 
application(s), live streaming deals, advertisements, and other sources; and (2) what, 
if any, fiduciary duty a college or university has to a scholarship athlete to ensure 
both the academic success of the student-athlete during matriculation as well as post-
graduation career development. 
By examining the disparate proportion of income generated by college athletics 
in comparison to the compensation received by the student-athlete in the form of 
athletic scholarships, this Article demonstrates that student-athletes do not receive 
the compensation they deserve for a myriad of reasons. In addition, this Article will 
reveal that while colleges may not have a “legal” fiduciary duty to ensure the 
academic success of both its current four-year varsity scholarship athletes and former 
scholarship players, colleges do have a reasonable duty to provide appropriate 
resources and/or support necessary for student-athletes to achieve a certain modicum 
of academic success and post-graduation career enhancement. 
II. ANALYZING COMPENSATION ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO STUDENT-
ATHLETES 
A. Player Likeness 
A critical issue in the debate over compensation of student-athletes is whether 
student-athletes should be compensated for their player-likeness.8 Universities often 
 
umentId=GALE%7CEJ3010490203&u=sand55832&zid=bfdd9a8a6cf2a5dc620970f20529569f (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2017). 
 5.  See McLeran, supra note 3, at 260–61; Ramogi Huma & Ellen J. Staurowsky, The $6 Billion Heist: 
Robbing College Athletes Under the Guise of Amateurism, NAT’L C. PLAYERS ASS’N, 9 (2012), http://assets. 
usw.org/ncpa/pdfs/6-Billion-Heist-Study_Full.pdf. 
 6.  See Huma & Staurowsky, supra note 5, at 9, http://assets.usw.org/ncpa/pdfs/6-Billion-Heist-
Study_Full.pdf. 
 7.  Id. at 8. 
 8.  See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016) (anti-trust lawsuit filed by current and former college athletes against the NCAA 
alleging Sherman Act violations for restraining trade in relation to players’ names, images, and likenesses); Travis 
Waldron, ESPN’s Jay Bilas Exposes NCAA’s Hypocrisy on Amateurism with Simple Web Search, 
THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 7, 2013), https://thinkprogress.org/espns-jay-bilas-exposes-ncaa-s-hypocrisy-on-
amateurism-with-simple-web-search-dba4300df7fd/. 
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print media guides for some of their larger or more lucrative programs such as 
football and basketball.9 These media guides, along with game schedules, posters, 
and radio and television advertisements feature a student-athlete’s likeness in order 
to garner interest in the particular athletic program.10 Arguably, student-athletes 
waive their right to player-likeness upon their agreement to accept an academic 
scholarship.11 The rationale behind this concept is rooted in an underlying contractual 
relationship amongst the parties whereby one party, the student-athlete, in effect, 
agrees that the university can use his/her image for the benefit of the university in 
exchange for the university’s pledge to provide a substantially discounted 
opportunity to attend college.12 
In the context of player-likeness, proponents of student-athlete compensation 
argue that an individual’s likeness provides the vehicle to sell tickets, collegiate 
apparel, concessions and obtain lucrative corporate partnerships.13 Therefore, 
proponents contend that student-athletes should be compensated for the usage of 
their likeness since their presence is the primary catalyst facilitating this form of 
commerce.14 
Critics of student-athlete compensation for usage of player-likeness claim that 
student-athletes receive compensation in the form of athletic scholarship, and 
therefore are sufficiently compensated.15 Critics believe that since the university 
provides the means for players to perform on national stages, thus facilitating a 
player’s exposure to media attention and professional scouting, adequate 
 
 9.  See, e.g., Archive of Ohio State Football Statistics and Media Guides, OHIO STATE BUCKEYES, 
http://www.ohiostatebuckeyes.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/statistics.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2017) 
(providing links to Ohio State football media guides for the last fifty years). 
 10.  See Maureen A. Weston, Gamechanger: NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation 
and the Future of College Sports, 3 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 77 (2013) (discussing NCAA rule requiring athletes to 
allow NCAA to use name and likeness for promotional purposes, and exploring ways to resolve antitrust and 
publicity rights issues NCAA is litigating). 
 11.  See id. at 84–86; John Keilman & Jared S. Hopkins, College Athletes Routinely Sign Away Rights to be 
Paid for Names, Images, CHI. TRIB. (March 26, 2015, 8:23 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
sports/college/ct-ncaa-waivers-met-20150326-story.html. 
 12.  Weston, supra note 10, at 84 – 86. 
 13.  See Huma & Staurowsky, supra note 5, at 9; Branch, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
 14.  See Branch, supra note 1, at 4–5; Sean Gregory, Time Cover Story: It’s Time to Pay College Athletes, 
TIME (Sept. 16, 2013), http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,2151167,00.html. 
 15.  See Alex Prewitt, Large Majority Opposes Paying NCAA Athletes, Washington Post-ABC News Poll 
Finds, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/large-majority-opposes-
paying-ncaa-athletes-washington-post-abc-news-poll-finds/2014/03/22/c411a32e-b130-11e3-95e8-39bef8e9a4 
8b_story.html?utm_term=.b5a20b279d89. 
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compensation is therefore provided in exchange for a university’s right to exploit the 
student-athlete’s player likeness.16 
B. Right to Publicity 
In the context of college athletics, the right to publicity is another major topic 
surrounding the issue of compensation.17 The right to publicity is derived from the 
tort right of privacy and protects an individual from unauthorized commercial 
exploitation of their identity.18 Right to publicity pertains to issues protecting an 
individual against defamation or libel.19 Under the current system, professional 
athletes and entertainers are entitled to a right to publicity and are paid accordingly.20 
NCAA collegiate athletes also have a right to publicity, however, their compensation 
is solely education-related because they are classified as “amateurs.”21 In other 
words, NCAA collegiate athletes can only be compensated for the full cost of 
attendance at their respective college/university.22 NCAA collegiate athletes, 
therefore, cannot be “offer[ed] cash sums untethered to educational expenses” 
 
 16.  See Brian Sweany, Steve Patterson, UT’s New Athletic Director, on Student-Athletes Profiting from 
Their Name and Likeness, TEXAS MONTHLY, Aug. 15, 2014, at 3–4, https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-stand-
up-desk/steve-patterson-uts-new-athletic-director-on-student-athletes-profiting-from-their-name-and-likeness. 
 17.  See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1268 (9th Cir. 
2013) (affirming that video game developer’s use of former college athlete’s likeness in its video games was not 
protected by the First Amendment, therefore former athlete’s right-of-publicity claims were not barred by 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute); Oliver Herzfeld et al., Athletes in Video Games: Balancing Publicity Rights 
and the First Amendment, FORBES, Sept. 22, 2016, at 1–2, https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/ 
2016/09/22/athletes-in-video-games-balancing-publicity-rights-and-the-first-amendment/#46a87e855b3e. 
 18.  Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 386–87 
(1999). 
 19.  Id. at 453. 
 20.  In 2016, it is estimated that athletes Roger Federer, Lebron James, and Phil Mickelson each made over 
fifty million dollars in endorsement deals based solely on their name, image, and likeness. See Top 100 Highest-
Paid Athlete Endorsers of 2016, OPENDORSE (June 29, 2016), http://opendorse.com/blog/2016-highest-paid-
athlete-endorsers/. As for entertainers, Beyoncé Knowles-Carter inked a fifty-million-dollar endorsement deal 
with Pepsi in 2012 for the use of her name, image, and likeness. Allison Aubrey, This is How Much Celebrities 
get Paid to Endorse Soda and Unhealthy Food, National Public Radio (June 7, 2016, 5:57 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/06/07/481123646/this-is-how-much-celebrities-get-paid-to-endorse-
soda-and-unhealthy-food. 
 21.  See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1289 (9th Cir. 
2013) (noting that the publicity rights of college athletes are remarkably restricted, and a college athlete’s right 
of publicity is “extraordinarily circumscribed and, in practical reality, nonexistent.”); O’Bannon v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting the NCAA “amateur” model restricts 
compensation to only education based benefits). 
 22.  Although this may vary from school to school, the full cost of attendance usually includes: (1) tuition 
and fees; (2) room and board; (3) books and supplies; and (4) transportation. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at n3. 
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because doing so would force the NCAA to “surrender[] its amateurism principles 
entirely.”23 
Not all legal scholars agree with the notion that, because an NCAA athlete is 
classified as an “amateur,” he/she cannot be compensated for exercising his/her right 
to publicity.24 In Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, author 
Alice Haemmerli utilizes Kantian philosophy to “justify an autonomy-based right of 
publicity.”25 Haemmerli argues that the right to publicity can be “an extension of 
human worth and autonomy.”26 She suggests that the right of publicity is a “property 
claim grounded in Lockean labor theory.”27 Under this framework, Haemmerli 
would likely contend that regardless of an individual’s status as an amateur athlete 
subject to NCAA regulations, the individual has an inherent right to exploit his/her 
right to publicity whether it be for pecuniary gain or simply for privacy reasons.28 
The argument against student-athletes retaining a right to publicity is that a 
college-athlete surrenders his/her rights to publicity when he/she accepts the NCAA 
regulations and terms governing athletic scholarships.29 Critics may argue that since 
the university retains the rights to the student-athlete’s likeness for university related 
promotional brochures or marketing material, the student-athlete does not retain a 
right of action against college administrators or corporate sponsors who legally 
transmit materials with the student-athlete’s likeness.30 
C. On-Field Performance 
NCAA Division I athletes perform on the field at the highest level of amateur 
athletics.31 The main issue in the context of compensation of student-athletes is 
whether an athlete should reap a portion of the financial benefits that he/she may 
 
 23.  Id. at 1078–79. 
 24.  See, e.g., Huma & Staurowsky, supra note 5, at 14. 
 25.  Haemmerli, supra note 18, at 383. 
 26.  Id. at 390. 
 27.  Id. at 388. 
 28.  See id. at 428. 
 29.  See, e.g., Kendall K. Johnson, Comment, Enforceable Fair and Square: The Right of Publicity, 
Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete Contracts, SPORTS L. J., 1, 6, 13–14 (2012); Darren Heitner, NCAA 
Fails Kicker Donald De La Haye And All Student-Athletes, FORBES, Aug. 3, 2017, at 1–4, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2017/08/03/ncaa-fails-kicker-donald-de-la-haye-and-all-student-
athletes/#1731d9493776. 
 30.  See Johnson, supra note 29, at 34. 
 31.  See generally Gary R. Gray & Scott E. Crowell, Risk Management Behaviors in NCAA Division I 
Athletic Programs, 3 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 64, 64 (1993) (“NCAA Division I athletes compete at the highest 
level of intercollegiate sports in America.”). 
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bestow upon the university.32 There is a quantifiable disparate proportion of income 
generated by student-athletes for university benefit in comparison to the 
compensation that student-athletes receive in the form of scholarships, financial aid 
packages, and the like.33 
In NCAA Division I Football, for example, if a college team qualified for a 
College Football Playoff Berth, the earning potential for a university could reach in 
the millions.34 For example, in 2004 “the Atlantic Coast Conference generated $17.7 
million just from the [Bowl Champion Series] alone, not including individual 
schools’ tickets sales or team apparel.”35 A single Bowl Champion Series berth could 
bring an individual university $13 million in revenue.36 When one considers that the 
average athletic scholarship being awarded today is approximately $18,000, one 
might argue that this form of compensation pales in comparison to the substantial 
financial gain accumulated by the university.37 
The “Pay-for-Play” advocates are proponents of compensating student-athletes 
for their on-field performance.38 They contend that “student-athletes are exploited by 
the universities for which they play in order to create a financial windfall for the 
universities.”39 In the past decade, the two most popular and typically greatest funded 
college programs are basketball and football, of which the “revenue generated by 
these two sports has increased nearly 300% such that they now fund almost all other 
 
 32.  See McLeran, supra note 3, at 256 (“As the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has 
transformed into an organization that runs a billion-dollar industry, a debate has begun about whether student-
athletes should be entitled to greater compensation than a one-year renewable athletic scholarship.”). 
 33.  Audrey C. Sheetz, Student-Athletes vs. NCAA: Preserving Amateurism in College Sports Amidst the 
Fight for Player Compensation, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 865, 866 (2016) (noting that the college sports industry is 
roughly $11 billion dollars and student athletes do not receive any revenue other than scholarships); Leslie E. 
Wong, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit: Ed O’Bannon Takes on the NCAA for Infringing on the Former 
Student-Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1069, 1093–94 (2010) (discussing the massive 
disparity between the billions of dollars of revenue generated from the use of collegiate athletes images versus 
the scholarships given to the players in return). 
 34.  Revenue Distribution, COLLEGE FOOTBALL PLAYOFF, http://www.collegefootballplayoff.com/revenue-
distribution (last visited Sept. 24, 2017). 
 35.  Mike Vivenzio, Should Athletes Receive Compensation?, THE PENDULUM ONLINE (Feb. 24, 2005), 
http://www.elon.edu/e-web/pendulum/issues/2005/02_24/sports/compensation.xhtml. 
 36.  See BCS Media Guide, SPORTSWRITERS.NET, www.sportswriters.net/fwaa/news/2002/bcsguide03.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2017) (detailing the revenue distributions for universities based on the BCS Bowl game). 
 37.  See Average Athletic Scholarship per Varsity Athlete, SCHOLARSHIPSTATS, http://www.scholarship 
stats.com/average-per-athlete.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2017) (detailing the average amount of funding 
collegiate athletes receive). 
 38.  Christopher W. Haden, Foul! The Exploitation of the Student-Athlete: Student-Athletes Deserve 
Compensation for Their Play in the College Athletic Arena, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 673, 674 (2001). 
 39.  Id. 
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sports programs.”40 For instance, in 1991, University of Notre Dame signed a “five-
year television deal worth $38 million to broadcast all Notre Dame Football home 
games.”41 Hypothetically, if there are 100 scholarships per football team, each 
student-athlete should receive $380,000 of that $38 million for his/her efforts.42 
Therefore, proponents of Pay-for-Play contend that the compensation received in the 
form of tuition is grossly disproportionate to the exorbitant profits retained by the 
university or college.43 
D. Income Generated from Apparel Sales 
Colleges and universities reap significant financial benefits from the sale of college 
sports team apparel.44 In the context of student-athlete compensation, it is crucial to 
examine the licensing and trademark issues that impact the bottom line in college 
athletics.45 For example, “the NCAA has approximately 35 licensees for 
merchandise, 16 marketing partners, 10 official ball licensees, 200 different domain 
names, and 40 U.S. trademarks and service marks.”46 Moreover, highly debatable 
issues arise as to whether student-athletes should be compensated in proportion to 
the amount of sales generated as an indirect result of the student-athlete’s athletic 
feats and whether or not a player should be entitled to sell his/her licensing rights on 
the open market.47 
Proponents of student-athlete compensation argue that the only reason the 
university is selling particular team apparel is, due in part, to the star college athlete’s 
appeal.48 However, critics may argue that the university retains the rights to the logo, 
 
 40.  Greg Skidmore, Payment for College Football Players in Nebraska, 41 HARV. J. LEGIS. 319, 319 
(2004). 
 41.  Richard Sandomir, College Football; Notre Dame Scored a $38 Million Touchdown on Its TV Deal, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 1991) http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/25/sports/college-football-notre-dame-scored-a-
38-million-touchdown-on-its-tv-deal.html. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Haden, supra note 38, 673–74. 
 44.  Id. at 673 (noting that NCAA member institutions benefit financially from lucrative contacts for things 
such as apparel and concession sales). 
 45.  See ADAM EPSTEIN, SPORTS LAW 243–44 (Thompson: Delmar Learning ed. 2003). 
 46.  Id. at 244. 
 47.  See generally Michael Aiello, Compensating the Student-Athlete, 23 SPORTS L.J. 157, 166–67 (2016) 
(evaluating various compensation schemes for student athletes); Aaron Brooks & David Davies, Exploring 
Student-Athlete Compensation: Why the NCAA Cannot Afford to Leave Athletes Uncompensated, 34 J.C. & U.L. 
747, 756–57 (2008) (exploring various compensation models and legislation including exempt players from 
NCAA restrictions and creating an open market competition system for schools to compensate students based on 
their value). 
 48.  Arash Afshar, Collegiate Athletes: The Conflict between NCAA Amateurism and a Student Athlete’s 
Right of Publicity, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 101, 117 (2014) (finding that “the profitability of collegiate 
merchandising is, in large part, attributed to the student-athletes that elevate the NCAA athletic experience”). 
KOBLENZ_Whole_Nine_Yards (DO NOT DELETE)  1/2/2018  3:29 PM 
THE WHOLE NINE YARDS 
44 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW 
trademarks, and licensing deals associated with the sale of college athletic apparel.49 
These critics contend that a student-athlete relinquishes any right to compensation in 
the form of licensing deals in exchange for a scholarship.50 
For example, the University of Michigan’s apparel sells “better than any other 
public college” in the United States.51 The University of Michigan has licensing deals 
for the sale of 600 different products.52 In 1999, the total revenue generated from the 
University of Michigan’s licensing deals was worth approximately $100 million, 
some of which, the university retains as royalty fees in exchange for the use of its 
names, logos, and colors.53 This amounts to approximately “$4.7 million in total 
royalties” retained by the university each year.54 Proponents of student-athlete 
compensation would argue that the student-athlete is grossly underpaid for his/her 
contribution in comparison to the royalties reaped by the college administration each 
year.55 
E. Exploring Limitations Imposed Upon “Amateur” College Athletes 
1. Case Studies of Student-Athletes: Jeremy Bloom & Mike Williams 
In exploring the limitations imposed upon “amateur” college athletes, it is imperative 
to analyze the situations involving two superstar college athletes, Jeremy Bloom56 
and Mike Williams.57 These two cases illustrate two unique situations where the 
NCAA had an opportunity to make an exception for these athletes, yet stayed the 
rigid course in furthering a bright-line rule distinguishing amateur sports from 
 
 49.  Trademark Licensing Policy, BOSTON U., https://www.bu.edu/brand/our-logos/licensing/ (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2017). 
 50.  Wong, supra note 33, at 1088–91. 
 51.  EPSTEIN, supra note 45, at 244. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  See McLeran, supra note 3, at 260–61 (discussing how NCAA licensing is a $4.6 billion industry and 
everyone is profiting but the student-athlete). 
 56.  Joel Eckert, Student-Athlete Contract Rights in the Aftermath of Bloom v. NCAA, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
905, 906–07 (2006). 
 57.  Michael R. Lombardo, Comment, Losing Collegiate Eligibility: How Mike Williams & Maurice Clarett 
Lost their Chance to Perform on College Athletics’ Biggest Stage, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
19, 36–38 (2005). 
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professional sports.58 Both of these cases represent the NCAA’s adversarial stance 
against student-athlete compensation.59 
Jeremy Bloom was both an Olympic skier and a member of the University of 
Colorado’s football team.60 Jeremy Bloom was an extremely talented athlete whom, 
prior to accepting a four-year athletic scholarship, had established himself as a world-
class skier on an international stage.61 In order to keep his dream of competing in the 
2006 Winter Olympic Games alive, Jeremy Bloom required financial support to 
continue his training.62 On the football field, Bloom was a highly acclaimed wide-
receiver with great speed and catching ability.63 In order to support his Olympic 
training, Bloom relied on corporate endorsement opportunities prior to attending 
college.64 NCAA rules prohibit an amateur athlete from receiving outside 
compensation while participating as an active member of a college team.65 Bloom 
challenged this rule, arguing that he was not receiving any financial gain in the 
capacity as a college football player but rather the compensation he would receive 
would be used solely for Olympic training.66 The case made its way to the Colorado 
Court of Appeals which upheld the NCAA rules committee’s decision prohibiting 
acceptance of a financial benefit by any college athlete.67 
Critics of the court’s ruling contend that Bloom never violated his eligibility status 
with the NCAA because his endorsement opportunity was completely separate from 
his participation in the college football program.68 While this case was a unique 
situation involving a talented two-sport athlete, it demonstrates the bright line rule 
that the NCAA has attempted to maintain between what it considers amateur athletics 
versus what is deemed professional sports.69 Essentially, this decision limited 
Bloom’s right to earn a living, thus forcing Bloom to choose between his two 
passions.70 
 
 58.  See id. at 36–38; see generally Laura Freedman, Comment, Pay or Play - The Jeremy Bloom Decision 
and NCAA Amateurism Rules, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673 (2003) (reviewing the 
NCAA’s bright line rule preventing a potential Olympic skier from competing and receiving prize money and 
endorsements if he wanted to keep his “amateur” play football for the University of Colorado). 
 59.  See Freedman, supra note 58, at 906–07. 
 60.  Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 622 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Eckert, supra note 56, at 907. 
 63.  Id. at 906. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Bloom, 93 P.3d at 625. 
 66.  Id. at 622. 
 67.  Id. at 628. 
 68.  Freedman, supra note 58, at 710. 
 69.  Id. at 688. 
 70.  Id. at 687. 
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Proponents of the court’s ruling argue that the precedent that could have been set 
had the ruling been in favor of Bloom may have had the potential of creating certain 
loopholes which allow for college-athletes to accept financial benefits without being 
subjected to NCAA sanctions.71 While some would disagree with the court’s ruling 
in this situation given the unique circumstances facing both the NCAA and the legal 
system, it is important that the NCAA maintain a bright line rule in order to prevent 
future abuse of the system.72 
In the second case study, Mike Williams was a highly touted wide receiver for the 
University of Southern California Trojans Football Team.73 After two stellar seasons 
as an All-American NCAA wide receiver catching thirty touchdowns and 
accumulating 2,579 receiving yards, Williams desired to test the professional market, 
presumably in the National Football League (“NFL”).74 However, the NFL already 
had a rule prohibiting individuals who were not three years removed from high 
school from entering the NFL Draft.75 
Shortly before the start of Williams’ junior campaign with the Trojans, Maurice 
Clarett, an excellent freshman running back whose on-field contributions brought 
Ohio State the National Championship in 2002, filed suit against the NFL 
challenging the “3 Year Rule.”76 At that time, Clarett was suspended by Ohio State 
for the upcoming season due to his off-field conduct in violation of university 
policy.77 Clarett, finding himself with no other outlet to cultivate his athletic talent, 
desperately desired to turn pro.78 A lower court ruling “struck down the ‘3 Year 
Rule,’ and suddenly the barn doors were flung open, ready for any freshman or 
sophomore who [was] confident in his ability to compete at the next level.”79 
Viewing this ruling as an opportunity to exploit his own skills at the pro level, Mike 
Williams, dropped out of USC and hired an agent.80 Williams also signed 
endorsement deals, reaping gifts and benefits in excess of $100,000.00.81 Shortly 
 
 71.  Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 40, Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 02CA2302 (Colo. 
App. Sept. 16, 2003). 
 72.  See, e.g., Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 40, Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 02CA2302 
(Colo. App. Sept. 16, 2003). 
 73.  Bob Plain, Personal Foul: Mike Williams Gets Screwed by the NCAA Again, THE SIMON MAG. 
ONLINE, http://www.thesimon.com/magazine/articles/article_of_the_week/0. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F.Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev’d in part, 306 F.Supp 
3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 77.  Id. at 388; Plain, supra note 73. 
 78.  Plain, supra note 73; see Clarett, 306 F.Supp. at 388. 
 79.  Plain, supra note 73. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
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thereafter, on appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s 
ruling finding in favor of the NFL, thus reinstating its coveted “3 Year Rule.”82 
As a result of the Second Circuit decision, Williams found himself in a precarious 
predicament, unable to earn a living in the NFL and ineligible to return to college 
football.83 He pleaded with the NCAA to reinstate his eligibility.84 The NCAA half-
heartedly entertained Williams’ plea for reinstatement, even designing a course of 
rehabilitation for Williams’ to follow, only to strike down Williams’ attempt at 
reinstatement just one day prior to the Trojans’ home opener.85 There is speculation 
that the NCAA had no intention, whatsoever, of reinstating Williams, and his attempt 
at reinstatement was merely a charade that the NCAA orchestrated simply to put 
other student-athletes on notice that anyone who signs with an agent and receives 
financial benefits will automatically lose his/her eligibility regardless of the 
circumstances.86 
Proponents of student-athlete compensation argue that Williams’ situation 
demonstrates the NCAA’s long standing ability to circumvent anti-trust laws in order 
to keep individuals from exploiting their own talents in the job market for pecuniary 
gain.87 Proponents contend that if student-athletes receive greater compensation for 
their efforts, then situations such as the one facing both Clarett and Williams may 
never have come to fruition.88 Proponents further argue that the NCAA, in collusion 
with the professional sports leagues that impose age limitations, provides a major 
disservice to student-athletes and thus creates potential future situations analogous 
to these case studies in which individuals are prevented from earning a living in the 
marketplace.89 Therefore, it is imperative that the NCAA either address the issue of 
 
 82.  See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 3d 124, 139 – 140 (2d Cir. 2004); Plain, supra note 
73. 
 83.  Plain, supra note 73. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Freedman, supra note 58, at 710 (2003). It can be argued, however, that student-athletes have begun to 
exploit their talents in the job market for pecuniary gain before entering college. For example, 
Adidas allegedly paid $100,000.00 to the family of a “heavily recruited high school standout,” steering him to 
play for a certain university. Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Coaches, Adidas Executive Face Charges; Pitino’s Program 
Implicated, N.Y. Times (Sep. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/sports/ncaa-adidas-bribery. 
html?mcubz=0. This practice, as well as alleged kick-backs to NCAA coaches to influence their student athletes, 
is a clear exploitation of the NCAA’s amateurism rules. Id. If student-athletes were compensated, such a “black 
market for teenage athletes” would not exist. Id. 
 88.  Alex Moyer, Throwing out the Playbook: Replacing the NCAA’s Anticompetitive Amateurism Regime 
with the Olympic Model, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 777 (2015); Paul Solman, Is the NCAA Failing Its College 
Athletes?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/is-the-ncaa-failing-its-
college-athletes/ (describing a situation where a student-athlete was suspended for accepting a benefit). 
 89.  Moyer, supra note 88, at 777 (discussing the collusion between professional sports leagues and the 
NCAA); Huma & Staurowsky, supra note 5, at 13; Pat Garofalo, NBA Age Limit is (March) Madness, U.S. NEWS 
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age restrictions with the professional sports leagues or loosen some of its more 
restrictive eligibility requirements.90 
The counter argument against student-athlete compensation is that since the 
NCAA is a private non-profit organization, free to impose its own regulatory scheme, 
those student-athletes that do not want to abide by the eligibility requirement should 
seek alternative means of honing their craft.91 Critics of student-athlete compensation 
contend that while Bloom’s, Williams’, and Clarett’s situations were unfortunate, 
these circumstances were an aberration and not the norm in college athletics.92 
2. Student-Athletes Leaving College Early to Pursue Professional Sports 
Today, more so than ever, student-athletes are leaving college early to pursue 
opportunities in professional sports.93 Financial gain is typically the main reason that 
student-athletes leave college early.94 For example, in a 2004 survey analyzing the 
graduation rates of each Division I men’s basketball team that participated in the 
2004 NCAA Tournament, 42 of the 65 participating teams graduated less than half 
of their players.95 Another study showed that “four of the [participating] colleges had 
 
(Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/pat-garofalo/2015/03/27/nba-age-limit-is-march-
madness (advocating the abolishment of the age limit in the NBA). 
 90.  Huma & Staurowsky, supra note 5, at 14 (“The U.S. Department of Justice should aggressively and 
whole-heartedly pursue antitrust suits against the NCAA to prevent further harm to college athletes, and Congress 
should act immediately to deregulate the NCAA. NCAA reform should be funded with new TV revenue streams 
that are surging throughout NCAA sport and include the following provisions.”). 
 91.  Glenn M. Wong, Warren Zola & Chris Deubert, Going Pro in Sports: Providing Guidance to Student-
Athletes in a Complicated Legal & Regulatory Environment, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 553, 577 n. 120 
(2011) (“There have been some highly publicized attempts to circumvent the rule.”). See Javier Morales, It’s 
Time for Draft Eligibility Rules that Make Sense for the Player, NCAA, and NBA, COLLEGE AD (Apr. 20, 2016), 
http://collegead.com/its-time-for-draft-eligibility-rules-that-make-sense-for-the-player-ncaa-and-nba/ 
(describing how Thon Maker skirted the NCAA’s eligibility rules by playing in Canada). 
 92.  Alan Milstein, The Maurice Clarett Story: A Justice System Failure, 20 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIV. L. 
REV. 216, 227 (2015) (stating that Maurice Clarett’s situation was more dire than that of most college athletes); 
see Jared Walch, Should Athletes be Paid to Play?, USA TODAY: COLLEGE (Oct. 20, 2016), http://college. 
usatoday.com/2016/10/20/should-athletes-be-paid-to-play/ (arguing that football and basketball bring the most 
revenue and it would be unfair to compensate them over other students). 
 93.  Blake Williams, The Numbers Behind the Record 107 College Players Leaving Early for the NFL, 
FORBES (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/blakewilliams3012/2016/01/22/the-numbers-behind-the-
record-107-college-players-leaving-early-for-the-nfl/#79c6fb640c0f (stating that a record 107 college football 
players declared for the NFL Draft in 2016). 
 94.  Brooks & Davies, supra note 47, at 756 (describing the difficult financial situation of student-athletes, 
of which many cannot afford even incidental expenses); see Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, Young Athletes, a Degree 
Matters, ESPN (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/8344785/young-athletes-degree-
matters; Walch, supra note 92 (stating that many players cite financial hardship as primary reason for declaring 
early for the draft). 
 95.  Dave Sheingold, March Madness Player’s Graduating Less Than Their Peers, USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 
2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/basketball/2017/03/23/march-madness-basketball-tourn 
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graduation rates of zero, and 16 had rates of 25 percent or less.”96 This phenomena 
has sparked debate as to whether college retention rates amongst student-athletes 
might be higher if student-athletes were adequately compensated for their efforts and, 
in turn, closer attention was paid by administrators to their academics.97 
Proponents of student-athlete compensation argue that it is in the best interest of 
both the university and the student to find ways to rectify this problem.98 From the 
university’s perspective, it can be debilitating for an athletic program to lose its top 
recruit after only one or two seasons.99 Consequently, the athletic program may find 
itself in a rebuilding stage for several years.100 From the student-athlete’s perspective, 
it is undeniably beneficial for a student to obtain a degree that can be utilized in the 
job market.101 
 
ament-players-graduating-less-graduation-rates/99509216/ (finding that players who participate in March 
Madness graduate at a 15-25% lower rate than the student body, based upon NCAA data). 
 96.  NCAA graduation rates improve, ESPN (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/ 
_/id/11779124/ncaa-graduation-rates-improve-critics-cry-foul (“Those who question the NCAA’s [graduation 
rate] stats contend the higher numbers are skewed because athletes have more access to tutors, learning specialists 
and multimillion-dollar academic centers—all of which are intended to keep players academically eligible and 
on track to graduate. They also believe athletes are sometimes being advised to take easier courses.”); see 
Sheingold, supra note 95 (“[T]he typical school in this year’s NCAA men’s basketball tournament graduates 50 
percent of its players within six years, compared to rate of 71.5 percent for student bodies as a whole.”). 
 97.  Walch, supra note 92 (“If college athletes were paid for the talents that they possess while in school, 
they might be more willing to finish their degree.”); see also Matthew J. Gustin, The O’Bannon Court Got It 
Wrong: The Case Against Paying NCAA Student-Athletes, 42 W. ST. L. REV. 137, 140 n.32 (2015). 
 98.  Brooks & Davies, supra note 94, at 755 (arguing that the NCAA has a responsibility to cover the entirety 
of the education costs for student-athletes on scholarship); Gustin, supra note 97, at 140 n.32 (stating that keeping 
talent in school through compensation could outweigh lost revenue from customers who disagree with a decision 
to compensate). 
 99.  See Dylan Hernandez, College Basketball’s So-Called One-and-Done Rule Needs Revisiting, L.A. 
TIMES (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/sports/la-sp-college-one-and-done-hernandez-20160324-
story.html (“The only beneficiary of the system is the NBA, which can use college competition instead of high 
school to screen its potential employees.”); Myron Medcalf, Roots of One-And-Done Rule Run Deep, ESPN (June 
26, 2012), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/ id/8097411/roots-nba-draft-one-done-rule-run-
deep-men-college-basketball (discussing the instability and academic ramifications that are a product of the one-
and-done rule in NCAA basketball). Contra NCAA, The True “One-and-Done” Problem in Division I Men’s 
Basketball, NCAA, (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/true-one-and-done-problem-
division-i-men-s-basketball (arguing that the real destabilizing force in college basketball is the high athlete 
transfer rate, not the one-and-done system) [hereinafter NCAA, One-and-Done] 
 100.  See Hernandez, supra note 99 (“The only beneficiary of the system is the NBA, which can use college 
competition instead of high school to screen its potential employees.”); Medcalf, supra note 99 (discussing the 
instability and academic ramifications that are a product of the one-and-done rule in NCAA basketball). 
Contra NCAA, One-and-Done, supra note 99 (arguing that the real destabilizing force in college basketball is 
the high athlete transfer rate, not the one-and-done system). 
 101.  Jennifer Cheeseman Day & Eric C. Newburger, The Big Payoff: Educational Attainment and Synthetic 
Estimates of Work-Life Earnings, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, at 4 (2002), https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/ 
p23-210.pdf (stating that individuals with a bachelor’s degree earn on average $2.1 million more than those who 
did not finish college); GALLUP-PURDUE INDEX REPORT: UNDERSTANDING LIFE OUTCOMES OF FORMER NCAA 
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Also, the additional time spent in college is viewed as being highly beneficial to 
the acceleration of a student-athlete’s maturation process since college students are 
still growing both physically and emotionally.102 If there were greater incentive for 
the student-athlete to remain at school, besides the obvious reward of attaining an 
education, then school retention rates might be higher.103 In addition, “legal” and 
ethical student-athlete compensation might reduce the abuse and corruption that 
occurs in college athletics on an underground level, thus diminishing the potential 
for overreaching booster influence.104 While a college setting may afford a student-
athlete a great opportunity for the student-athlete to hone his/her athletic skills and 
receive an education at the same time, the NCAA sometimes fails to consider the 
portion of student-athletes that desire to better not only themselves, but also their 
families.105 
Critics of compensation for student-athletes claim that by financially rewarding a 
student-athlete simply for his/her athletic prowess, the college, in turn, is 
consequently undermining the value of providing a highly discounted education.106 
Critics contend that financially rewarding student-athletes at the expense of funding 
 
STUDENT-ATHLETES 3 (2016), http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2016_Gallup_NCAA_Student_Athlete_ 
Report_20160503.pdf (“Former student-athletes who received a bachelor’s degree between 1970 and 2014 are 
leading other college graduates in four out of five elements of well-being that Gallup studied.”). 
 102.  Hernandez, supra note 99, at 2 (reciting NBA Commissioner Adam Silver’s belief that more time in 
college makes student-athletes better prepared to be professionals); GALLUP-PURDUE INDEX REPORT: 
UNDERSTANDING LIFE OUTCOMES OF FORMER NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETES, supra note 101, at 3 (stating that 
student athletes who earns degrees do better than non-athletes in life). 
 103.  Steve Murphy & Jonathan Pace, A Plan for Compensating Student-Athletes, BYU EDUC. & L.J. 167, 
177–78 (1994) (“A possible positive effect of paying student-athletes could be that more athletes would stay in 
school to finish their degree programs.”). 
 104.  Michael Rosenberg, A Simple Solution to NCAA Corruption: Let Stars get Paid, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 
(July 26, 2011), https://www.si.com/more-sports/2011/07/26/ncaa-pay (arguing in favor of athlete compensation 
to reduce NCAA corruption); David M. Simon, End NCAA Cheating and Corruption: Just Pay Student Athletes, 
WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 28, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/end-ncaa-cheating-and-corruption-
just-pay-student-athletes/article/2632529 (allowing payments to athletes will reduce corruption). 
 105.  Eckert, supra note 56, at 916–17 (arguing that the “courts should analyze under a stricter standard those 
claims brought by athletes who allege a failure to value the athletes’ welfare over their athletic contributions”). 
 106.  Katherine Kargl, Note, Is Amateurism Really Necessary or is it an Illusion Supporting the NCAA’s 
Anticompetitive Behaviors: The Need for Preserving Amateurism in College Athletics, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 379, 
392–93 (2017) (“Education is the universities’ main purpose, and paying the athletes would severely undermine 
this objective.”); Wong, supra note 33, at 1102 (arguing that compensation detracts from the value of a student 
athletes education, thereby damaging the amateurism model); Ekow N. Yankah, Why NCAA Athletes Shouldn’t 
be Paid, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/sporting-scene/why-ncaa-
athletes-shouldnt-be-paid (arguing that paying athletes reduces the value of the education being offered).  
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cultural programs, such as the arts, stifles creativity and negates achievement in many 
other facets of academia.107 
F. Taxation Issues 
Under the current federal tax structure, universities “enjoy certain tax benefits based 
on the student-athletes’ amateur educational status.”108 As a result, universities 
receive favorable tax treatment on the revenue generated from college athletics.109 
Since college athletics are designated by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to be 
an integral part of the education requirements of a university, universities receive 
favorable tax treatment compared to similarly situated businesses or corporations.110 
Because the IRS does not consider a university to be engaged in a commercial 
venture for profit, this designation makes it increasingly difficult for proponents of 
student-athlete compensation to circumvent tax and labor law in order to legally 
compensate a student-athlete in accordance with both federal and NCAA 
guidelines.111 
G. Antitrust Law and Labor Issues 
Antitrust laws, specifically the Sherman Act, are a critical ingredient for non-profit 
organizations associated with the world of amateur sports.112 The main goals of 
antitrust laws are to remove “anti-competitive collusion and to prevent monopolistic 
 
 107.  See, e.g., Roxanne Schroeder-Arce, Why do We Value Sports Over the Arts?, MY SAN ANTONIO: 
EXPRESS-NEWS (Mar. 5, 2016, 8:11 AM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/article/Why-do-
we-value-sports-over-the-arts-6872039.php.  
 108.  Haden, supra note 38, at 678 (“The pay-for-play advocates encounter additional obstacles in their 
quest to compensate the student-athlete due to the various tax benefits universities enjoy based on the student-
athletes’ amateur educational status.”); see also Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47 (“[T]he athletic scholarships 
are awarded by the university primarily to aid the recipients in pursuing their studies, and therefore, the value of 
the scholarships is excludable from the recipients’ gross incomes under section 117 of the Code.”). 
 109.  Haden, supra note 38, at 678. 
 110.  26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2017); See John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and College 
Athletics, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 109, 113 (2010) (“The NCAA and private universities, however, rely for their 
exempt status on Section 501(c)(3), which provides exemption for charitable organizations, including religious 
and educational organizations.”). 
 111.  26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2017); Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, the Student Athlete, and the 
Professionalization of College Athletics, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 35, 54 (1987) (“Under existing law, colleges quite 
simply have no clear protection from taxation of income attributable to professional sports.”). 
 112.  Wendy T. Kirby & T. Clark Weymouth, Antitrust and Amateur Sports: The Role of Noneconomic 
Values, 61 IND. L.J. 31, 31 (1985) (“In recent years, courts have begun to address the question of how to apply 
the antitrust laws to nonprofit organizations and other entities which, although they operate in the commercial 
marketplace, assert ‘noneconomic’ justifications for their behavior. This question is becoming increasingly 
important to the National Collegiate Athletic Association (‘NCAA’) and similar amateur sports organizations.”). 
KOBLENZ_Whole_Nine_Yards (DO NOT DELETE)  1/2/2018  3:29 PM 
THE WHOLE NINE YARDS 
52 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW 
and oligopolistic market structures.”113 Antitrust law is used to describe all laws that 
intend to promote and regulate competition and make our competitive economic 
system work.114 In the context of college athletics, the legal issues that arise concern 
whether the laws should be applied to non-profit organizations such as the NCAA.115 
In essence, the NCAA’s designation as a non-profit organization has sheltered it from 
antitrust violations despite the numerous profits derived by the universities as a 
result.116 Recently, however, this has begun to shift as evident by the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Sports Athletic Association.117 
In O’Bannon, the Court held that the NCAA’s compensation rules were subject 
to antitrust scrutiny.118 The Court reasoned that even though the NCAA’s amateurism 
rules helped create the “character and quality” of the NCAA’s product,119 the rules 
can be invalidated under the Rule of Reason analysis.120 This analysis requires that 
the plaintiff prove: (1) the restraint on trade creates anticompetitive effects in a 
specific market; (2) there is no procompetitive justification for the restraint; and (3) 
the restraint is either not reasonably necessary to achieve its objectives or those 
objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.121 
Applying the Rule of Reason analysis, the Court first held that there was a college 
education market in which the NCAA compensation rules created an anticompetitive 
effect.122 The Court then held that the NCAA’s limits on student-athlete 
compensation do not make college sports “more attractive.”123 Rather, it is the 
NCAA’s commitment to amateurism and integration of academics and athletics that 
 
 113. O. Yale Lewis, Jr., Amateur Athletes and the Law, HENDRICK & LEWIS (2005); see Mission, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUST.: ANTITRUST DIVISION, https://www.justice.gov/atr/mission (last visited Oct. 12, 2017) (“The goal of the 
antitrust laws is to protect economic freedom and opportunity by promoting free and fair competition in the 
marketplace.”). 
 114.  Daphne Alabama & Howard Bartee, Jr., The Role of Antitrust Laws in the Professional Sports Industry 
from a Financial Perspective, 8 THE SPORT J., no. 2, at 2 http://www.thesportjournal. org/2005Journal/ Vol8-
No2/harry-bartee.asp (Oct. 4, 2004); see Guide to Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www. 
ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws (“These laws promote vigorous competition and 
protect consumers from anticompetitive mergers and business practices.”). 
 115.  Kirby & Weymouth, supra note 112, at 32; Lewis, supra note 113. 
 116.  Lewis, supra note 113 (citing a number of cases illustrating how courts have used anti-trust laws to 
shield the NCAA). 
 117.  802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  The product being amateur collegiate athletes participating in sporting events. Id. at 1063 (citing Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984)). 
 120.  O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 277 (2016). 
 121.  See id. at 1070 (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of Southern Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 1072. 
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promote pro-competitive purposes.124 The Court then analyzed the plaintiff’s 
proposals for substantially less restrictive alternatives to the NCAA’s compensation 
rules.125 The first alternative was compensation up to the total cost of attendance.126 
The Court determined this was an acceptable alternative because it would not cause 
consumers of college sports to become less interested.127 As for the second 
alternative, allowing students to receive compensation for their right to publicity, the 
Court found it was restrictive.128 Unlike the first alternative, this alternative directly 
contradicted the NCAA’s interest in promoting amateurism because “not paying 
student athletes is precisely what makes them amateurs.”129 From the Court’s 
perspective, the difference between the two proposals was a “quantum leap.”130 
Therefore, the Court upheld the lower court’s permanent injunction requiring the 
NCAA to permit schools to provide compensation up to the cost of attendance, but 
vacated the lower court’s permanent injunction requiring the NCAA to allow schools 
to pay their athletes for their right to publicity.131 
In recent years, organized labor issues have come to the forefront of debate in the 
context of student-athlete compensation.132 Currently, “NCAA student-athletes are 
not represented by a players union.”133 Proponents of student-athlete compensation 
contend that “while athletic department coaches and administrators are often paid 
handsomely,” student-athletes should have the opportunity to organize in order “to 
seek payment for their services” and potentially negotiate a collective bargaining 
agreement with the NCAA.134 In 2015, the Northwestern University football players 
filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) seeking a 
determination that “the University’s football players who receive grant-in-aid 
scholarships are employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the National Labor 
Relations Act and direct an election in a unit of the grant-in-aid players.”135 The 
 
 124.  Id. at 1076. 
 125.  Id. at 1074. The Ninth Circuit’s Rule of Reason Analysis test does not consider whether the restraint is 
not reasonably necessary to achieve its objectives. Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
 126.  O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 277 (2016).  
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 1076. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. at 1078. 
 131.  Id. at 1079. 
 132.  See Shane Loughlin, Note, Workers’ Compensation and Student-Athletes: Protecting the Unpaid Talent 
in the Profit-Making Enterprise of Collegiate Athletics, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1737, 1739–41 (2016). 
 133.  EPSTEIN, supra note 45, at 233. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
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NLRB unanimously decided to decline jurisdiction on the grounds that the “case 
would not serve to promote stability in labor relations.”136 
Workers’ compensation is another labor issue that arises in the context of student-
athlete compensation.137 “Workers’ compensation laws are state statutes enacted to 
compensate employees for job-related injuries or death, regardless of fault.”138 The 
argument made by proponents of Pay-for-Play clashes with the concepts of workers’ 
compensation because “in order to qualify for recovery under state workers’ 
compensation statutes, a person must meet the statute’s definition of an “employee” 
as defined by the statute.”139 On one side of the argument, proponents of student-
athlete compensation contend that the student-athletes are underpaid for their 
services, however in the context of workers’ compensation this argument fails 
because of the legalities involved in classifying a student-athlete as an employee of 
the university.140 In addition, from an education policy stand point, the ramifications 
for classifying student-athletes as employees could potentially blur and subsequently 
erode the lines of demarcation distinguishing student-athletes from university 
employees.141 
NCAA rules and regulations, for instance, prohibit student-athletes from signing 
with agents for the purpose of procuring outside employment.142 The NCAA 
contends that student-athletes no longer claim the rights and benefits accorded by 
their amateur status upon receipt of financial benefits or outside employment for 
monetary gain.143 Within its NCAA Division I manual, the NCAA represents that its 
fundamental motivation is to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of 
the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, 
by doing so, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and 
professional sports.”144 
 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Sean Alan Roberts, College Athletes, Universities, and Workers’ Compensation: Placing the 
Relationship in the Proper Contact by Recognizing Scholarship Athletes as Employees, 37 S. TEX L. REV 1315, 
1327–28 (1996). 
 138.  Haden, supra note 38, at 676. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 674, 676. 
 141.  Harold B. Hilborn, Comment, Student-Athletes and Judicial Inconsistency: Establishing a Duty to 
Educate as a Means of Fostering Meaningful Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics, 89 NW. U.L. REV. 741, 777 
(1995). 
 142.  NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, SUMMARY OF NCAA ELIGIBILITY REGULATIONS  NCAA 
DIVISION I 3 (2017), 
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017DICOMP_SummaryofNCAARegulations_20170613.pdf. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETE ASS’N, 2017-2018 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 1 (2017); see EPSTEIN, 
supra note 45, at 19. 
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In Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, a Notre Dame football 
player brought suit against the NCAA “after losing his college eligibility by 
submitting himself for the NFL Draft and signing with an athlete agent.”145 In Banks, 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that “Banks had failed to define an anti-
competitive effect of the alleged restraints on the markets.”146 The Seventh Circuit 
further concluded that “these (NCAA) rules were valid rules furthering the goal of 
amateurism, and that the rules were very similar to grade and enrollment 
requirements.”147 
Furthermore, it seems horribly unjust that a student-athlete is prevented from 
competing in the market place for his/her services, yet the universities and colleges 
are able to retain all profits from that player’s on-field performance.148 However, 
critics of student-athlete compensation argue that the NCAA must maintain a bright 
line rule between amateurism and professionalism; otherwise the NCAA would be 
opening the door for abuse and corruption of the college education system.149 
H. Title IX Implications 
It is undeniable that Title IX, since its inception, has had a profound impact upon 
college athletics.150 In the context of student-athlete compensation, Title IX remains 
a highly controversial and widely debated issue.151 In theory, the main goal of Title 
IX is to provide equal opportunity and funding to both men and women’s collegiate 
programs.152 In Sports Law, author Adam Epstein contends that: “[p]roponents of the 
law argue that Title IX continues to benefit women socially, economically, and even 
emotionally.”153 
In reality, however, “revenue [generating] sports such as football and men’s 
basketball serve as the cash cow for women’s sports nationwide.”154 Often times, the 
money generated from men’s programs is re-allocated to benefit a university’s entire 
 
 145.  Lewis, supra note 113 (citing Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1083–84 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Keilman & Hopkins, supra note 11. 
 149.  See Kargl, supra note 106, at 393. 
 150.  Ellen J. Staurowsky, Title IX and College Sports: The Long Painful Path to Compliance and Reform, 
14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 95, 98–99 (2003). 
 151.  Michael Rosen, Note, Constitutional Implications of Title IX Compliance in Colleges and Universities, 
18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 503, 509 (2012). 
 152.  Allison Williams, Comment, Title IX- Tipping the Scales of Equality, 2005 DENV. U. SPORTS & ENT. L. 
J. 1, 2 (2005). 
 153.  EPSTEIN, supra note 45, at 105. 
 154.  Id. at 114. 
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athletic department.155 As a result, conflicts arise when a student-athlete loses his or 
her scholarship or receives less financial support as a direct result of a Title IX 
measure.156 
Proponents of student-athlete compensation argue that under certain 
circumstances student-athletes should be compensated in order to offset financial 
hardships directly related to Title IX mandated budgetary cuts to programs.157 Often 
times these financial hardships result in a reduction in scholarships for some men’s 
teams and the elimination of some teams altogether.158 Consequently, many of these 
student-athletes find themselves with few financial outlets to fund general college 
expenses.159 With respect to critics of Title IX, Epstein suggests that “[m]uch of the 
criticism of [Title IX] involves the interpretation of how it is applied.”160 While 
critics of Title IX may contend that Title IX unfairly penalizes men’s sports programs 
to a certain degree, the “courts have not held this argument to be a valid one under a 
Title IX analysis.”161 Therefore, in order to remedy this apparent funding problem, 
the NCAA, in accordance with Congress, should reassess the applicability of Title 
IX and its impact on college athletics in the context of student-athlete compensation. 
 
 155.  See id. (generalizing that if men’s programs are funding women’s programs while at the same time 
cutting other non-revenue men’s programs, then the revenue generating men’s programs are funding the entire 
athletic department). 
 156.  See Andrew J. Boyd, Comment, Righting the Canoe: Title IX and the Decline of Men’s Intercollegiate 
Athletics, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 257, 258–62 (explaining that Title IX is a contributing factor to men losing 
opportunities to play sports and men losing scholarship opportunities at institutions. These results have been 
actively challenged in the courts). 
 157.  See Ross E. Simpson, Note, The Previous Pay is Under Further Review: Payment Problems Arising 
from O’Bannon v. NCAA, 68 ARK. L. REV. 1117, 1130 (2016) (arguing that one interpretation of the O’Bannon 
decision is that there would not be Title IX violations if cost-of-attendance stipends were delivered exclusively 
to male student-athletes because unequal compensation of male and female athletes is permissible if the male 
student-athletes are using a higher degree of skill, responsibility, and effort than their female counterparts). 
 158.  See Kerensa E. Barr, Comment, How the Boys of Fall are Failing Title IX, 82 UMKC L. REV. 181, 200 
(2013) (revisiting the history of NCAA football scholarships and determining that there was originally no limit 
on the amount of scholarships awarded but which progressively reduced to 105 in 1973, 95 in 1975, and finally 
to the current level of 85 in 1994-1995); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 45, at 105 (establishing that “numerous 
male swimming, wrestling, football, water polo, baseball, and other programs have been eliminated in the name 
of Title IX compliance.”). 
 159.  See Christopher Davis, Jr. & Dylan Oliver Malagrinò, The Myth of the Full Ride: Cheating our 
Collegiate Athletes and the Need for Additional NCAA Scholarship-Limit Reform, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 605, 612 
(2013) (explaining that if “[t]he difference between the estimated cost of attendance and the full grant-in-aid is 
approximately $3000 annually, depending on the institution” those who lose some or all of their scholarship will 
incur more debt to fund general college expenses). 
 160.  EPSTEIN, supra note 45, at 105. 
 161.  See id. at 115 (determining that case law is unfriendly to the claim that Title IX unfairly penalizes men’s 
sports programs). 
KOBLENZ_Whole_Nine_Yards (Do Not Delete) 1/2/2018  3:29 PM 
 ADAM H. KOBLENZ 
VOL. 13, NO. 1 2017 57 
I. Financial Destitute and Post-Graduation Debt 
Many scholarship student-athletes find that the financial package that they received 
in the form of an athletic scholarship is insufficient to meet the financial demands of 
attending college for four years.162 This financial insecurity stems from expensive 
living costs, i.e. rent, books, and food, which are usually not covered by athletic 
scholarship.163 In addition to the rigid time constraints imposed by team commitment 
requirements, NCAA regulations hamper a student-athlete’s ability to be gainfully 
employed full-time during the academic year.164 
For instance, while the NCAA promulgated a rule that permits a student-athlete 
to be employed during the academic year, the NCAA prohibits compensation for any 
publicity, reputation, fame, or personal following that a student-athlete may provide 
to his or her employer.165 Considering the tremendous living expenses associated 
with attending college and the limited amount of time student athletes have to work, 
it becomes very difficult for student-athletes to stay afloat financially.166 All of these 
factors contribute to a system in which some student-athletes find themselves 
“financially destitute” post-graduation.167 For example, a 2005 survey of 5,600 
NCAA student-athletes found that “the average student-athlete plans to graduate with 
approximately $14,200 in student loans and credit card debt.”168 This survey also 
revealed that student-athletes envision themselves earning at least a starting salary of 
 
 162.  See Davis, Jr. & Malagrinò, supra note 159, at 612 (establishing that “[t]he difference between the 
estimated cost of attendance and the full grant-in-aid is approximately $3,000 annually, depending on the 
institution”). 
 163.  See id. at 617, 620 (citing out of pocket expenses such as cell phone bills, laundry, toiletries, food, 
entertainment, and transportation costs as reasons why student-athletes cannot meet the financial demands 
associated with college). 
 164.  Michael P. Acain, Comment, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure for the Exploitation of College Athletes, 
18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 307, 315 (1998) (in 1996, the NCAA passed a rule allowing student-athletes to have part-
time jobs to make up the difference between what a scholarship is worth and the actual cost of attendance). 
 165.  Jon Solomon, 10 Ways College Athletes Can Get Paid and Remain Eligible for Their Sport, CBS 
SPORTS (June 21, 2016), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/10-ways-college-athletes-can-get-
paid-and-remain-eligible-for-their-sport/. 
 166.  See Caitlin D. Buckstaff, Comment, Covering the Spread: An Assessment of Amateurism and 
Vulnerability of Student-Athletes in an Emerging Culture of Sports Wagering, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 133, 
157 (2013) (explaining that “many college players live below the federal poverty line . . . [because] most athletic 
scholarships failed to cover the essentials like food and clothing.”). 
 167.  See John A. Maghamez, Comment, An All-Encompassing Primer on Student-Athlete Name, Image, and 
Likeness Rights and How O’Bannon v. NCAA and Keller v. NCAA Forever Changed College Athletics, 9 LIBERTY 
U. L. REV. 313, 317 (2015) (explaining that even student-athletes with the maximum scholarships can end up in 
debt between $12,888 and $30,000 because these scholarships only cover room and board, tuition, and books). 
 168.  NCAA News Release, College Athletes Optimistic About Financial Future, But Survey Shows 
Unrealistic Expectations, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION (Oct. 24, 2005), http://fs.ncaa.org/ 
Docs/PressArchive/2005/Corporate%2BNews/College%2BAthletes%2BOptimistic%2BAbout%2BFinancial%
2BFuture%2BBut%2BSurvey%2BShows%2BUnrealistic%2BExpectations.html. 
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approximately “$64,500,” when in actuality, the average starting salary for a college 
graduate is “$32,000.”169 The reality is that both student-athletes and college 
administrators are not in tune with the financial hardships that await student-athletes 
after graduation.170 It is imperative that the NCAA promulgate rules loosening 
earning restriction requirements, otherwise the NCAA will be perpetuating a culture 
of student-athletes unprepared for the financial struggles that occur both during and 
after graduation. 
J. Efforts at Reform 
Efforts to protect student-athletes and their earning capacity are underway in certain 
jurisdictions throughout the United States.171 In California, for example, the state 
legislature adopted a “Bill of Rights” for college athletes.172 The California Bill of 
Rights was designed to protect student-athletes from exploitation.173 Earlier versions 
of the bill eliminated rules for the terms or duration of scholarships below the cost of 
tuition, gave an athlete the ability to transfer when his or her coach leaves the school, 
and reduced the earning capacity restrictions with respect to off-campus jobs held 
while school is in session.174 Ultimately, these provisions did not make the final 
version of the bill passed by the California state legislature.175 The California Bill of 
Rights only protects incapacitated or injured student athletes, and requires athletic 
 
 169.  See Harold L. Sirkin, Reality Check on Starting Pay, FORBES (May 11, 2017, 2:06 PM), https://www. 
forbes.com/sites/haroldsirkin/2017/05/11/reality-check-on-starting-pay/#6bf272257c9a (explaining that 52% of 
college graduates expect to make at least $50,000 or more per year); see also Kelsey Gee, Outlook is Rosier for 
Class of ‘17, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2017) (stating that the base pay for college grads is $49,785). 
 170.  See Doug Webber, To Ease the Student Debt Crisis, Hold Universities Accountable, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, 
(April 6, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/to-ease-the-student-debt-crisis-hold-colleges-
responsible/ (arguing that while the public focus has been on the role of students borrowing money and the role 
of government encouraging such lending, we also need to focus on the universities role in the student debt issue). 
 171.  Legislation was introduced during both the 113th and 114th sittings of Congress that attempted to help 
protect student athletes, but both measures failed to garner enough support. See generally Collegiate Student 
Athlete Protection Act, H.R. 3545 113th Cong. (2013); National Collegiate Athletic Association Act, H.R. 2731, 
114th Cong. (2015). In 2017, Connecticut Representatives Patricia Dillion, Matthew Lesser, and Josh Elliot 
introduced a bill aimed at protecting the health and safety of college athletes. See generally H.B. 6870, 2017 
Conn. Gen. Assemb. Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2017). 
 172.  See generally CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 67450–53 (2013). 
 173.  See Matthew R. Cali, Comment, The NCAA’s Transfer of Power: An Analysis of the Future Implications 
the Proposed NCAA Transfer Rules Will Have on the Landscape of College Sports, 21 JEFFERY S. MOORAD 
SPORTS L.J. 217, 242–43 (2014) (explaining that states such as California are taking steps to recognize, provide, 
and protect the rights of student athletes). 
 174.  S.B. 1525, 2011-2012 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (as amended by S. Comm. On Rules, Mar. 27, 2012). 
 175.  Compare CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 67450–53 (2013), with S.B. 1525, 2011-2012 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) 
(as amended by S. Comm. On Rules, Mar. 27, 2012). 
KOBLENZ_Whole_Nine_Yards (Do Not Delete) 1/2/2018  3:29 PM 
 ADAM H. KOBLENZ 
VOL. 13, NO. 1 2017 59 
programs to conduct financial and life skills workshops for first-year and third-year 
student athletes.176 
In another effort at reform, commencing in 2004, the Division I Academic Cabinet 
Agents and Amateurism Subcommittee agreed to support a “legislative concept that 
would prohibit institutions, conferences and the NCAA from using a student-
athlete’s name or likeness for retail sales while the student-athlete still has eligibility 
remaining.”177 The Subcommittee met with CEOs in the licensing and manufacturing 
industries, University Athletic Directors and student-athlete representatives with the 
intent of tightening the NCAA’s licensing rules.178 While former NCAA President 
Myles Brand offered encouraging words at this subcommittee stating: “[o]ur 
[NCAA] bottom line is educating students, whereas the bottom line for pros is 
making profits,” the reality is that the NCAA serves as an intermediary, brokering 
“For-Profit” deals between universities and the licensing and manufacturing 
industries.179 Brand further clarified: “We need to draw a much brighter line between 
promotions and revenue gain. It’s a cutting-edge distinction between college and pro 
sports and it’s important that we get it right.”180 Ultimately, only time will tell 
whether these efforts at reform come to fruition when the bottom line is at stake in 
the overall equation. 
III. EXAMINING A COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY’S FIDUCIARY DUTY TO ITS 
STUDENT-ATHLETES 
A. Current Four-Year Scholarship Athletes 
Upon signing a letter of intent to attend a particular institution, many college-athletes 
are promised, by their universities or colleges, compensation in the form of a four-
year athletic scholarship.181 In turn, student-athletes are advised by the university of 
his/her obligations to remain eligible for these scholarships.182 Some of these 
requirements include: minimum grade point average, qualifying for a roster position, 
 
 176.  See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 67452–53 (2013). 
 177.  Gary T. Brown, Cabinet Subcommittee launches review of Licensing Issues, NCAA NEWS (June 21, 
2004), https://web.archive.org/web/20050214210000/http://www.ncaa.org/news/2004/20040621/active/4113 
n02.html. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Patrick Hruby, Why Top NCAA Recruits Shouldn’t Sign National Letters of Intent, VIBE SPORTS (Feb. 
1, 2017), https://sports.vice.com/en_ca/article/pgn38z/why-top-ncaa-recruits-shouldnt-sign-national-letters-of-
intent (“Enter the NLI. By signing the letter, an athlete agrees to attend a particular school; in return, the school 
agrees to give that player an athletic scholarship. In theory, this is all well and good.”). 
 182.  Maintaining Your Eligibility, How to Keep Your Scholarship, ATHLETES USA, http://athletes-
usa.com/blog/maintaining-eligibility-keep-scholarship/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2017). 
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and high performance on the athletic field.183 Failure to meet some of these 
requirements, in some instances, results in the loss of a scholarship.184 
In recent years, student-athletes have attempted to exercise their legal rights to an 
education through the court system.185 Many of these lawsuits have come in the form 
of contractual claims.186 In the landmark case, Ross v. Creighton University, a 
talented basketball player sued the “school for failing to give him a meaningful 
education.”187 In Ross, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Ross needed 
to show a specific promise and failure to deliver on that promise.”188 The Seventh 
Circuit elucidated in its decision that this was an “‘educational malpractice claim’ (a 
claim not heard by the courts) re-packaged as a contract claim” and therefore ruled 
against the student-athlete on those narrow grounds.189 
In Jackson v. Drake University, a slightly different case concerning a contractual 
right to academics and sports, the student-athlete claimed that the school “interfered 
with his academics as well as his participation in basketball because he was subjected 
to verbal abuse.”190 The student believed that the verbal abuse was allegedly the 
catalyst for the student’s voluntary departure from the university.191 In Jackson, the 
Iowa State court granted summary judgment to the university on the grounds, again, 
that it did not permit educational malpractice claims.192 Both of these cases 
demonstrate the judicial system’s unwillingness to hold universities liable for 
“educational malpractice claims,” due in part, to the precedent it would set and the 
potential flood of litigation claims that might arise when a student-athlete believed 
that his/her right to an education was infringed upon.193 
B. Former Scholarship Student-Athletes 
Former scholarship student-athletes, who for one reason or another, may have lost 
their scholarship often face financial hardships to pay for college, and consequently 
 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  See Lewis, supra note 113. 
 186.  See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992); Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 
1490 (S.D. Iowa 1991).  
 187.  See Lewis, supra note 113 (citing Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. (citing Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1492 (S.D. Iowa 1991)). 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992); Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 
1490, 1492 (S.D. Iowa 1991).  
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tend to either fail or drop out.194 It is important to analyze what, if any, fiduciary duty 
a university may have to these former scholarship athletes. On first glance, it does 
not seem equitable that a former scholarship athlete could be deserted by an academic 
institution simply due to sub-par athletic performance. 
This notion of university abandonment does not speak glowingly of higher 
education.195 When one considers, for example, a hypothetical situation where a 
university offers a student a scholarship in the arts, it would be unheard of for the 
university to terminate a student’s financial support simply because he/she either was 
not performing on Broadway or his/her artwork was not on display at a notable art 
gallery. In other words, therein lies a double standard in college education when a 
student-athlete’s athletic achievement is solely connected to his/her financial 
support.196 Whereas in other facets of academia, scholarship students do not face 
such intense scrutiny, and are less likely to be subjected to such rigid scholarship 
eligibility requirements as under the current system.197 
IV. CONCLUSION 
College athletics serve as a critical staple of American culture, more so today than 
ever before.198 As the number of individuals attending college has increased, so has 
the interest in college athletics.199 While college athletics provide physically gifted 
students with an opportunity to hone their athletic skills, promote discipline, and 
build character, the reality is that there is also a flourishing business side to it that 
seeks to exploit the purest form of amateurism.200 
The reality is that college athletics generate millions of dollars in revenue for 
universities across the country, helping to fund college programs, pay professors and 
 
 194.  See Jamilah King, How Scholarships Leave Student-Athletes Powerless in the NCAA Game, 
COLORLINES, (Mar. 23, 2012), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/how-scholarships-leave-student-athletes-
powerless-ncaa-game. 
 195.  See id. (recounting the experience of a former Penn State Basketball player whose scholarship was taken 
away because of her sexual orientation). 
 196.  See id. 
 197.  See Deborah Ziff, 4 Myths About Athletic Scholarships, U.S. NEWS, https://www.usnews.com/ 
education/best-colleges/paying-for-college/articles/2017-10-04/4-myths-about-athletic-scholarships (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2017) (explaining the rigorous criteria in obtaining an athletic scholarship); see also Scholarships, 
DAUGHTERS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, https://www.dar.org/national-society/scholarships/specific-
scholarships-0 (last visited Sept. 24, 2017) (explaining the criteria for performing arts scholarships). 
 198.  See King, supra note 195 (stating that college athletics receive non-stop media coverage during March 
Madness). 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  See id. (quoting a recent study, which stated that “National College Player’s Association found that in 
2009-10, the poorest basketball and football players generated combined revenues in each sport of more than $30 
million but lived $3,000 to $5,000 below the poverty line”). 
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erect campus buildings.201 The student-athletes’ status under the current framework, 
however, remains one of controversial debate.202 College athletes are still exploited 
for their athletic prowess, often at the expense of a quality education.203 Therefore, it 
is critical that this issue be addressed in a constructive and equitable manner that 
strikes a delicate balance between the preservation of higher education and the 
uncompromising protection of the legal rights of the student-athlete. 
 
 
 201.  Maurice Peebles, 7 Common Sense Reasons Why College Athletes Should Be Paid (According to Jay 
Bilas), COMPLEX SPORTS, (Dec. 3, 2017) http://www.complex.com/sports/2015/12/jay-bilas-interview/. 
 202.  See id. (addressing why college athletes deserve to be paid). 
 203.  King, supra note 195. 
